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1 Introduction
Unilateral CVA
Basel II defines the counterparty credit risk as the risk that the counterparty
to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction.
If the party who defaulted is a debtor to the other party in the transaction
at the default time, then this would result in an economic loss for the non-
defaulted party.
Situations where only default of one of the two parties is taken into ac-
count are referred to as unilateral counterparty risk. In such cases only the
default of one name impacts valuation. The resulting adjustment to the
otherwise default-free price of the deal, computed by the party whose de-
fault is not considered, is termed unilateral Credit Valuation Adjustment
(UCVA). Unilateral CVA has been considered for example in Sorensen and
Bollier (1994) and in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2001), among others. Pricing of
UCVA under netting is considered for example in Brigo and Masetti (2005),
whereas UCVA with collateral is discussed in some stylized cases and for ba-
sic products such as forward contracts in Cherubini (2005). Precise pricing
of UCVA on several asset classes with full arbitrage free dynamic models and
wrong way risk is then considered in Brigo and Pallavicini (2007) (Interest
rate swaps under netting and derivatives), Brigo and Bakkar (2009) (Oil
swaps), and Brigo and Chourdakis (2009) (Credit, and CDS in particular),
although these works do not account for collateralization.
Despite the unilateral CVA being considered in the beginning by several
institutions, Basel II had recognized the bilateral nature of counterparty risk,
mentioning that unlike a firm’s exposure to credit risk through a loan, where
the exposure to credit risk is unilateral and only the lending bank faces
the risk of loss, the counterparty credit risk creates a bilateral risk of loss.
The market value of the transaction can be positive or negative to either
counterparty to the transaction. It follows that if both parties may default,
then the counterparty risk calculation becomes a bilateral one.
Indeed, the ongoing financial crisis has made quite clear that the unilat-
eral assumption is not realistic. In particular, this assumption has been put
into question by the seven credit events on financials that happened in one
month during the period going from September, 7 2008 to October, 8 2008,
namely the credit events on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers,
Washington Mutual, Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing.
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Bilateral CVA
The bilateral counterparty risk feature was first considered in the literature
by Duffie and Huang (1996), who present a model for valuing claims subject
to default by both contracting parties, such as swap and forward contracts. In
their approach, when counterparties have different default risk, the promised
cash flows of the swap are discounted using a switching discount rate that,
at any given state and time, is equal to the discount rate of the counterparty
for whom the swap is currently out of the money. A general formula for
bilateral counterparty risk evaluation that carefully takes into account the
appropriated cash flows in every event was given in Bielecki and Rutkowski
(2001), where the analysis then focuses on the particular case of interest
rate swap contracts. The importance of considering the bilateral nature is
again mentioned in the excellent exposition of Canabarro and Duffie (2004)
on the mechanics and valuation of counterparty risk, where it is stated that
both parties may face exposures depending on the value of the positions they
hold against each other. Picoult (2005) also reports a detailed formula with
discussion of bilateral default risk. However, this is a simplified formula that
does not check which counterparty defaults first but simply subtracts the
two unilateral CVA adjustments seen by the two parties without considering
the actual sequence of default times. This involves some double counting.
Brigo and Capponi (2008) develop a fully rigorous formula, showing that
the bilateral counterparty risk adjustment (BCVA) computed by one of the
two parties is obtained as a difference of two terms: a Credit Valuation
Adjustment driven by the default event of the other party, and a Debit
Valuation Adjustment (DVA) driven by the default of the party that is doing
the calculation. They include the proper sequence of default events into the
formula to avoid double counting. See also Gregory (2009). The DVA term
involves some counterintuitive features, such as the fact that when the credit
quality of a party worsens its mark to market increases.
The ongoing financial crisis has led the Basel Committee to revisit the
guidelines to follow for OTC derivatives transactions, moving towards a new
set of rules commonly called “Basel III”, and reviewed in Basel III Proposal
(2010). Beside stressing the need to capture correctly the dependence be-
tween market and credit risks, also known as wrong- and right-way risk, which
was not adequately incorporated into the Basel II framework, they proposed
several other amendments. Those include extending the margin period of risk
for OTC derivatives, increasing the incentives to use central counterparties to
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clear trades, and enhancing the controls regarding the re-hypothecation and
re-investment of collaterals. Duffie and Zhu (2010) address the mitigation
of counterparty risk exposure through the use of central clearing counter-
parties. They show that, adding a central clearing counterparty for credit
default swaps can reduce the netting efficiency and lead to an increase in
average exposures to counterparty default.
Basel III also considers CVA as a key element in the analysis of risk.
Since during the crisis about two thirds of losses have been due to CVA
mark to market and only about one third to actual defaults (see for example
Nathanae¨l (2010)), Basel III is encouraging institutions to include CVA mark
to market future simulations in Value at Risk type measures. However, Basel
III also suggests a bond equivalent approach to compute CVA in a simple way.
This bond equivalent approach is rather unrealistic, focuses on unilateral
CVA and again cannot account properly for wrong way risk except through
multipliers.
Bilateral CVA with Collateral
In this paper, we study how counterparty risk exposure can be reduced
through the use of collateralization. The idea of collateralization of coun-
terparty risk is very similar to the way collateral is used to mitigate lending
risk, with collateral used to reduce credit exposure. However, because of
the uncertainty of counterparty credit exposure and the bilateral nature of
counterparty credit risk, collateral management is much more complex in the
case of counterparty risk. Exposure of one counterparty to another changes
every day, and to keep the current exposure under control, it is necessary to
post collateral frequently, ideally on a daily basis. The collateral should be
used to hedge the exposure that one party has to the other on the default
event. The collateral can be in the form of risk-free cash flow or of a (de-
faultable) asset. In the latter case, it should not be correlated to the value of
the transaction, and be liquid, i.e. sold quicky and easily if the need arises.
We develop an arbitrage-free valuation framework for bilateral counter-
party risk adjustments, inclusive of collateralization. We provide model in-
dependent formulas that give the bilateral collateralized credit valuation ad-
justment (abbreviated throughout the paper with BCCVA) for portfolios
exchanged between a default risky investor and a default risky counterparty.
Such formulas are given by the sum of option payoff terms, where each term
depends on the netted exposure, i.e. the difference between the on-default
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exposure and the on-default collateral account. We consider both the case
when collateral is a risk-free asset kept into a segregate account and only used
upon default occurrence to net exposure, and also the case when collateral
can be lent or re-hypothecated before default occurrence, thus making the
party who posted collateral an unsecured creditor.
For the moment, we leave aside some issues linked to counterparty risk
evaluation, which may be relevant in particular settings; among them we cite
funding costs, collateral dispute resolutions, and independent amounts. Since
these problems are currently under active investigation by ISDA to tune the
Master Agreement and Credit Support Annexes in a post-crisis scenario, we
prefer to address them in a further development of our work waiting for ISDA
recommendation on definitions and relative market practice. We also leave
aside the inclusion of features such as goodwill, for which we refer to Kenyon
(2010).
This paper generalizes the framework for risk-neutral valuation of bi-
lateral counterparty risk introduced in Brigo and Capponi (2008), who do
not model the impact of collateralization. We then specialize our analysis
to interest-rate payouts as underlying portfolio, and allow for correlation be-
tween the default times of the investor, counterparty and underlying portfolio
risk factors. By following Brigo et al. (2009) we use arbitrage-free stochastic
dynamical models and consider the following dependencies:
• Dependence between default of the counterparty and default of the
investor;
• Correlation between the underlying (interest rates) and the counter-
party credit spread;
• Correlation between the underlying (interest rates) and the investor
credit spread;
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
collateral account process, and develops a formula for computing the bi-
lateral collateralized credit value adjustment (abbreviated throughout the
paper with BCCVA), i.e. including counterparty risk and collateralization.
Section 3 presents some examples of collateralization mechanisms. Section 4
presents an application of the bilateral CVA formula to interest rates swap
contracts, illustrating the impact of the collateral frequency on the bilateral
CVA adjustment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Collateralized Credit Value Adjustment
Risk neutral evaluation of counterparty risk in presence of collateral man-
agement can be difficult, due to the complexity of clauses. There are only a
few papers in the literature dealing with it, among them Cherubini (2005),
Assefa et al. (2009), and Alavian et al. (2008). Assefa et al. (2009) consider
a highly stylized model for the collateral process without accounting for min-
imum transfer amounts, collateral thresolds, and assume that the collateral
account is risk-free and cannot be re-hypothecated. Alavian et al. (2008)
discuss features such as minimum transfer amount and collateral thresholds
and give model independent formulas for the counterparty exposure, netted
of collateralization, but again assuming the collateral is a risk-free asset.
The objective of this section is to provide a model independent formula for
the counterparty value adjustment, inclusive of collateralization mitigation,
and allowing for default risk of both parties. In the next subsections, we
develop a general framework for computing such quantity, and along the way
we show the relation between the mathematical formulation and the ISDA
Standards (2010).
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Subsection 2.1 introduces
the mathematical setup. Subsection 2.2 discusses the close-out netting rules
and introduces the concept of counterparty and investor on-default exposure.
Subsection 2.3 discusses how the collateral account can be used throughout
the life of the transaction, for example it can be re-hypothecated. Subsection
2.4 provides model-independent formulas which follow naturally from the
written standards and contractual rules described in the earlier sections.
Subsection 2.5 discusses the issues of calculating on-default exposures.
2.1 Mathematical Setup
We refer to the two names involved in the financial contract and subject to
default risk as
investor → name “I”
counterparty → name “C”
We denote by τI and τC respectively the default times of the investor and
counterparty. We place ourselves in a probability space (Ω,G,Gt,Q). The
filtration Gt models the flow of information of the whole market, including
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defaults and Q is the risk neutral measure. This space is endowed also
with a right-continuous and complete sub-filtration Ft representing all the
observable market quantities but the default event, thus Ft ⊆ Gt := Ft ∨Ht.
Here, Ht = σ({τI ≤ u} ∨ {τC ≤ u} : u ≤ t) is the right-continuous filtration
generated by the default events, either of the investor or of his counterparty
(and of the reference credits if the underlying portfolio is credit sensitive).
Let us call T the final maturity of the payoff which we need to evaluate
and define the stopping time
τ = τI ∧ τC (1)
We define the collateral account Ct to be a stochastic process adapted to
the filtration Gt. Intuitively, this means that the collateral account at time
t “knows” the values of all the market observables up to time t, including
which entities have defaulted by t.
We assume that the collateral account is held by the collateral taker, with
both investor and counterparty posting or withdrawing collateral during the
life of a deal, to or from the collateral account. The other party is the
collateral provider. We see all payoffs from the point of view of the investor.
Therefore, when Ct > 0, this means that by time t the overall collateral
account is in favor of the investor and the net posting has been done by
the counterparty, meaning that what is in the account at t is the excess of
posting done by the counterparty with respect to the investor posting. In
this case the collateral account Ct > 0 can be used by the investor to reduce
his on-default exposure. On the contrary, when Ct < 0, this means that the
overall collateral account by time t is in favor of the counterparty, and has
been net-posted by the investor. In this case collateral can be used by the
counterparty to reduce his on-default exposure.
Thus when Ct > 0 this means that, at time t, the collateral taker is the
investor and the collateral provider is the counterparty, whereas in the other
case the collateral taker is the counterparty and the collateral provider is the
investor.
We assume the collateral account to be a risk-free cash account, although
in general it can be any other (defaultable) asset, which can be liquidated at
the default time. Further, we assume that the collateral account is opened
anew for each new deal and it is closed upon a default event or when maturity
is reached. If the account is closed, then any collateral held by the collateral
taker would be required to be returned to the originating party. We assume
Ct = 0 for all t ≤ 0, and Ct = 0, if t ≥ T .
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We call Π(u, s) the net cash flows of the claim under consideration (not
including the collateral account) without investor or counterparty default
risk between time u and time s, discounted back at u, as seen from the point
of view of the investor. We denote by ΠD(u, s, C) the analogous net cash
flows of the claim under counterparty and investor default risk, and inclusive
of collateral netting. The counterparty valuation adjustment in presence of
collateralization is given by
BCCVA(t, T, C) := Et
[
ΠD(t, T, C)
]− Et[ Π(t, T ) ]
In order to evaluate the CVA inclusive of collateralization, we need to
express ΠD(t, T, C) in terms of risk-free quantities, default indicators and
collateral. In particular we should describe which operations the investor
and the counterparty perform to monitor and mitigate counterparty credit
risk, and which operations, on a default event, the surviving party performs
to recover from potential losses.
Remark 2.1 (Collateral Delay and Dispute Resolutions)
In practice there is a delay between the time when collateral is requested
and the time when it gets posted. This is due to collateral settlement rules
or to one party (or both parties) disputing on portfolio or collateral pricing.
Typically, the delay is limited to one day, but it may be longer. According
to the ISDA Collateral Dispute Resolution Protocol (2009) the parties may
agree either on a standard timing schedule (disputes end within three days),
or on an extended one (disputes end within nine days). Exceptionally, further
delay may take place due to a mutual consent of both parties or due to specific
market concerns (total delay cannot exceed thirty days). We do not consider
collateral posting delay in this paper leaving this issue for future research.
2.2 Close Out Netting Rules
The ISDA Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral Collateralization
Practices (2010) on section 2.1.1. states the following:
The effect of close-out netting is to provide for a single net
payment requirement in respect of all the transactions that are
being terminated, rather than multiple payments between the par-
ties. Under the applicable accounting rules and capital require-
ments of many jurisdictions, the availability of close-out netting
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allows parties to an ISDA Master Agreement to account for trans-
actions thereunder on a net basis
This means that, upon the occurrence of a default event, the parties
should terminate all transactions and do a netting of due cash-flows. More-
over, the ISDA Credit Support Annex, subject to New York Law, on para-
graph 8 states
The Secured Party will transfer to the Pledgor any proceeds
and posted credit support remaining after liquidation, and/or set-
off after satisfaction in full of all amounts payable by the Pledgor
with respect to any obligations; the Pledgor in all events will re-
main liable for any amounts remaining unpaid after any liquida-
tion and/or set-off.
This means that the surviving party should evaluate the transactions
just terminated, due to the default event occurrence, and claim for a reim-
bursement only after the application of netting rules, inclusive of collateral
accounts. We can find similar clauses also in CSAs subject to different laws.
The ISDA Master Agreement defines the term close-out amount to be the
amount of the losses or costs of the surviving party would incur in replacing
or in providing for an economic equivalent at the time when the counterparty
defaults. Notice that the close-out amount is not a symmetric quantity w.r.t.
the exchange of the role of two parties, since it is valued by one party after
the default of the other one.
The replacing counterparty may ask the surviving party to post more
than the exposure to the old defaulted counterparty to compensate for liq-
uidity, or the deteriorated credit quality of the surviving party. Instead of
the close-out amount we introduce the on-default exposure, namely the price
of the replacing transaction or of its economic equivalent. We distinguish
between on-default exposure of investor to counterparty and of counterparty
to investor at time t, and denote it as follows
• εI,t denotes the on-default exposure of the investor to the counterparty
at time t. A positive value for εI,t means that the investor is a creditor
of the counterparty.
• εC,t denotes the on-default exposure of the counterparty to the investor
at time t. A negative value for εC,t means that the counterparty is a
creditor to the investor.
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2.3 Collateral Re-Hypothecation
In case of no-default happening, at final maturity the collateral provider ex-
pects to get back from the collateral taker the remaining collateral. Similarly,
in case of default happening earlier (and assuming the collateral taker be-
fore default to be the surviving party), after netting the collateral with the
cash flows of the transaction, the collateral provider expects to get back the
remaining collateral on the account. However, it is often considered to be im-
portant, commercially, for the collateral taker to have relatively unrestricted
use of the collateral until it must be returned to the collateral provider. This
unrestricted use includes the ability to sell collateral to a third party in the
market, free and clear of any interest of the collateral provider. Other uses
would include lending the collateral or selling it under a “repo” agreement or
re-hypothecating it. Although under the English Deed the taker is not per-
mitted to re-hypothecate the collateral, the taker is allowed to do so under
the New York Annex, the English Annex or the Japanese Annex. When the
collateral taker re-hypothecates the collateral, then he leaves the collateral
provider as an unsecured creditor with respect to collateral reimbursement.
In case of re-hypothecation, the collateral provider must therefore con-
sider the possibility to recover only a fraction of his collateral. If the in-
vestor is the collateral taker, we denote the recovery fraction on collateral
re-hypothecated by the defaulted investor by REC′I , while if the counter-
party is the collateral taker, then we denote the recovery fraction on col-
lateral re-hypothecated by the counterparty by REC′C . Accordingly, we de-
fine the collateral loss incurred by the counterparty upon investor default by
LGD′I = 1−REC′I and the collateral loss incurred by the investor upon counter-
party default by LGD′C = 1−REC′C . Typically, the surviving party has prece-
dence on other creditors to get back his collateral, thus RECI ≤ REC′I ≤ 1,
and RECC ≤ REC′C ≤ 1. Here, RECI (RECC) denote the recovery fraction of the
market value of the transaction that the counterparty (investor) gets when
the investor (counterparty) defaults.
Notice that the case when collateral cannot be re-hypothecated and has
to be kept into a segregate account is obtained by setting REC′I = REC
′
C = 1.
We need to mention that collateral re-hypothecation has been heavily
criticized and is currently debated. See for example the Senior Supervisors
Group (2009) report, that observes the following:
Custody of assets and re-hypothecation practices were dom-
inant drivers of contagion, transmitting liquidity risks to other
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firms. In the United Kingdom, there was no provision of central
bank liquidity to the main broker-dealer entity, Lehman Brothers
International (Europe), and no agreement was struck to transfer
client business to a third-party purchaser. As a result, LBIE filed
for bankruptcy while holding significant custody assets that would
not be returned to clients for a long time, and therefore could not
be traded or easily hedged by clients. In addition, the failure of
LBIE exposed the significant risks run by hedge funds in allowing
their prime broker to exercise re-hypothecation rights over their
securities. Under U.K. law, clients stand as general creditor for
the return of such assets.
The loss of re-hypothecated assets and the “freezing” of cus-
tody assets created alarm in the hedge fund community and led
to an outflow of positions from similar accounts at other firms.
Some firms’ use of liquidity from re-hypothecated assets to finance
proprietary positions also exacerbated funding stresses.
2.4 Bilateral CVA Formula under Collateralization
We start by listing all the situations that may arise on counterparty default
and investor default events. Our goal is to calculate the present value of
all cash flows involved by the contract by taking into account (i) collateral
margining operations, and (ii) close-out netting rules in case of default. No-
tice that we can safely aggregate the cash flows of the contract with the
ones of the collateral account, since on contract termination all the posted
collateral is returned to the originating party.
Collecting CVA Contributions
We start considering all possible situations which may arise at the default
time of the counterparty, which is assumed to default before the investor. In
our notation
X+ = max(X, 0), X− = min(X, 0).
We have
1. The investor measures a positive (on-default) exposure on counterparty
default (εI,τC > 0), and some collateral posted by the counterparty is
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available (CτC > 0). Then, the investor exposure is reduced by netting,
and the remaining collateral (if any) is returned to the counterparty. If
the collateral is not enough, the investor suffers a loss for the remaining
exposure. Thus, we have
1{τ=τC<T}1{εI,τ>0}1{Cτ>0}(RECC(εI,τ − Cτ )+ + (εI,τ − Cτ )−)
2. The investor measures a positive (on-default) exposure on counterparty
default (εI,τC > 0), and some collateral posted by the investor is avail-
able (CτC < 0). Then, the investor suffers a loss for the whole expo-
sure. All the collateral (if any) is returned to the investor if it is not
re-hypothecated, otherwise only a recovery fraction of it is returned.
Thus, we have
1{τ=τC<T}1{εI,τ>0}1{Cτ<0}(RECCεI,τ − REC′CCτ )
3. The investor measures a negative (on-default) exposure on counterparty
default (εI,τC < 0), and some collateral posted by the counterparty is
available (CτC > 0). Then, the exposure is paid to the counterparty,
and the counterparty gets back its collateral in full.
1{τ=τC<T}1{εI,τ<0}1{Cτ>0}(εI,τ − Cτ )
4. The investor measures a negative (on-default) exposure on counter-
party default (εI,τC < 0), and some collateral posted by the investor
is available (CτC < 0). Then, the exposure is reduced by netting and
paid to the counterparty. The investor gets back its remaining collat-
eral (if any) in full if it is not re-hypothecated, otherwise he only gets
the recovery fraction of the part of collateral exceeding the exposure.
1{τ=τC<T}1{εI,τ<0}1{Cτ<0}((εI,τ − Cτ )− + REC′C(εI,τ − Cτ )+)
Symmetrically, we consider all possible situations which can arise at the
default time of the investor, which is the earliest to default. We have
1. The counterparty measures a positive (on-default) exposure on investor
default (εC,τI < 0), and some collateral posted by the investor is avail-
able (CτI < 0). Then, the counterparty exposure is reduced by netting,
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and the remaining collateral (if any) is returned to the investor. If the
collateral is not enough, the investor suffers a loss for the remaining
exposure. Thus, we have
1{τ=τI<T}1{εC,τ<0}1{Cτ<0}(RECI(εC,τ − Cτ )− + (εC,τ − Cτ )+)
2. The counterparty measures a positive (on-default) exposure on investor
default (εC,τI < 0), and some collateral posted by the counterparty is
available (CτI > 0). Then, the counterparty suffers a loss for the whole
exposure. All the collateral (if any) is returned to the counterparty
if it is not re-hypothecated, otherwise only a recovery fraction of it is
returned. Thus, we have
1{τ=τI<T}1{εC,τ<0}1{Cτ>0}(RECIεC,τ − REC′ICτ )
3. The counterparty measures a negative (on-default) exposure on investor
default (εC,τI > 0), and some collateral posted by the investor is avail-
able (CτI < 0). Then, the exposure is paid to the investor, and the
investor gets back its collateral in full.
1{τ=τI<T}1{εC,τ>0}1{Cτ<0}(εC,τ − Cτ )
4. The counterparty measures a negative (on-default) exposure on investor
default (εC,τI > 0), and some collateral posted by the counterparty is
available (CτI > 0). Then, the exposure is reduced by netting and paid
to the investor. The counterparty gets back its remaining collateral
(if any) in full if it is not re-hypothecated, otherwise he only gets the
recovery fraction of the part of collateral exceeding the exposure.
1{τ=τI<T}1{εC,τ>0}1{Cτ>0}((εC,τ − Cτ )+ + REC′I(εC,τ − Cτ )−)
Now, we can aggregate all these cash flows, along with cash flows coming
from the default of the investor and the ones due in case of non-default,
inclusive of the cash-flows of the collateral account. Let D(t, T ) denote the
risk-free discount factor. By summing all contributions, we obtain
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ΠD(t, T ;C) =
1{τ>T}Π(t, T )
+ 1{τ<T}(Π(t, τ) +D(t, τ)Cτ )
+ 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)1{εI,τ<0}1{Cτ>0}(εI,τ − Cτ )
+ 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)1{εI,τ<0}1{Cτ<0}((εI,τ − Cτ )− + REC′C(εI,τ − Cτ )+)
+ 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)1{εI,τ>0}1{Cτ>0}((εI,τ − Cτ )− + RECC(εI,τ − Cτ )+)
+ 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)1{εI,τ>0}1{Cτ<0}(RECCεI,τ − REC′CCτ )
+ 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)1{εC,τ>0}1{Cτ<0}(εC,τ − Cτ )
+ 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)1{εC,τ>0}1{Cτ>0}((εC,τ − Cτ )+ + REC′I(εC,τ − Cτ )−)
+ 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)1{εC,τ<0}1{Cτ<0}((εC,τ − Cτ )+ + RECI(εC,τ − Cτ )−)
+ 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)1{εC,τ<0}1{Cτ>0}(RECIεC,τ − REC′ICτ )
By a straightforward calculation we get
ΠD(t, T ;C) = Π(t, T )
− 1{τ<T}D(t, τ)
(
Π(τ, T )− 1{τ=τC}εI,τ − 1{τ=τI}εC,τ
)
− 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)(1− RECC)(ε+I,τ − C+τ )+
− 1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)(1− REC′C)(ε−I,τ − C−τ )+
− 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)(1− RECI)(ε−C,τ − C−τ )−
− 1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)(1− REC′I)(ε+C,τ − C+τ )−
Notice that the collateral account enters only as a term reducing the exposure
of each party upon default of the other one, taking into account which party
posted the collateral.
BCCVA General Formula
As last step we introduce the mid-market mark-to-market exposure εu with
t ≤ u ≤ T as given by
εu := Eu[ Π(u, T ) ] , t ≤ u ≤ T
which represents the risk-free price of all cash flows remaining after time u up
to maturity T . Hence, by taking risk-neutral expectation of both sides of the
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equation expressing BCVA, and by plugging in the definition of mid-market
exposure, we obtain the general expression for collateralized bilateral CVA.
BCCVA(t, T ;C) = −Et
[
1{τ<T}D(t, τ)
(
ετ − 1{τ=τC}εI,τ − 1{τ=τI}εC,τ
) ]
− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDC(ε
+
I,τ − C+τ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
C(ε
−
I,τ − C−τ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDI(ε
−
C,τ − C−τ )−
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
I(ε
+
C,τ − C+τ )−
]
(2)
The first term on right-hand side of the above equation represents the
mismatch in calculating mid-market mark-to-market exposure and on-default
exposures. The second and third terms are the counterparty risk due to
counterparty’s default (also known as counterparty valuation adjustment or
CVA), and come with a negative sign (always from the point of view of the
investor). The fourth and fifth terms represent the counterparty risk due to
investor’s default (also known as debit valuation adjustment or DVA) and
come with a positive sign (again from the point of view of the investor).
CCVA and CDVA Definitions
We may introduce Collateralized Credit Valuation Adjustment (CCVA) and
Collateralized Debit Valuation Adjustment (CDVA), and rewrite the general
expression for collateralized bilateral CVA as
BCCVA(t, T ;C) =− Et
[
1{τ<T}D(t, τ)
(
ετ − 1{τ=τC}εI,τ − 1{τ=τI}εC,τ
) ]
− CCVA(t, T ;C)
+ CDVA(t, T ;C)
where
CCVA(t, T ;C) := Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDC(ε
+
I,τ − C+τ )+
]
Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
C(ε
−
I,τ − C−τ )+
]
and
CDVA(t, T ;C) :=− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDI(ε
−
C,τ − C−τ )−
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
I(ε
+
C,τ − C+τ )−
]
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Remark 2.2 (CCVA/CDVA vs. Collateral Adjusted UCVA) Notice
that CCVA is not the unilateral CVA adjusted for collateral as seen from the
investor “I” when assuming only the counterparty “C” may default, since
this is also driven by the default time of the investor itself. Similarly, CDVA
is not simply the unilateral CVA adjustment seen from the point of view of
the counterparty when assuming that only the investor may default, since it
contains also the counterparty default time.
2.5 Close-Out Amount Evaluation
The ISDA Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral Collateralization
Practices (2010) on section 2.1.5. states the following:
Upon default close-out, valuations will in many circumstances
reflect the replacement cost of transactions calculated at the ter-
minating party’s bid or offer side of the market, and will often
take into account the credit-worthiness of the terminating party.
However, it should be noted that exposure is calculated at mid-
market levels so as not to penalize one party or the other. As a
result of this, the amount of collateral held to secure exposure may
be more or less than the termination payment determined upon a
close-out.
The close-out amount is defined by the ISDA Master Agreement either
as a replacement cost or as an economic equivalent of the terminated trans-
action, by acting in “good faith” and by using “commercially reasonable”
procedures. Notice that the choice on how to compute the on-default ex-
posure is left to the surviving party and there is not a clear statement on
evaluation timing schedule. Indeed, the surviving party may require several
days to complete the close-out procedure. We refer to Parker and McGarry
(2009) for a detailed description of failings and issues related to the close-out
amount evaluation procedure.
Remark 2.3 (Margin Period of Risk) The time elapsed between the de-
fault event and the completion of the close-out procedure is named the margin
period of risk. The Basel III Proposal (2010) warns to increase the margin
period of risk to capture the illiquidity of collateral and trades, the length of
margin call disputes, as well as the costs of trade replacement and operations,
in order to avoid exposure underestimates. For instance, they say that, if the
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trade involves illiquid collateral, or derivative that cannot be easily replaced,
the margin period of risk should be equal to the collateral margining update
interval plus 20 days.
The ISDA Market Review continues with
Other differences in the valuation methodologies applied to
the determination of any payment on early termination also con-
tribute to the potential for discrepancy between these two amounts.
A party may take into account the costs of terminating, liquidating
or re-establishing any hedge or related trading position. Further,
it will also be reasonable to consider the cost of funding.
The on-default exposure depends on many other factors besides the credit-
worthiness of the surviving party. If we start considering such effects, we
should add also the funding costs for our trading and collateral positions as
well. In particular while determining a close-out amount, the determining
party may consider any relevant information, including:
1. quotations (either firm or indicative) for replacement transactions sup-
plied by one or more third parties that may take into account the
credit-worthiness of the determining party;
2. informations consisting of relevant market data; or
3. informations from internal sources if used by the determining party in
the regular course of its business for the valuation of similar transac-
tions.
Such broad framework prevents to achieve a tight definition of close-out
amount or of on-default exposure, and it can clearly produce a wide range
of results. See, for instance, Weeber and Robson (2009) where the authors
show realistic examples on how evaluating the close-out amount.
Yet, if we disregard the issues coming from loosely defined terms, we could
approximate on-default exposures εI,τC and εC,τI with the value a of replace-
ment operation with a risk-free counterparty (with the same collateralization
rule), as shown in Pallavicini (2010). Hence, if we apply our collateralized
bilateral CVA formula to the risk-free payoff to include the credit-worthiness
of the surviving party, we get
εI,τC
.
= ετC − Et
[
1{τC<τI<T}D(τC , τI)LGDI(ε
−
τI
− C−τI )−
]
− Et
[
1{τC<τI<T}D(τC , τI)LGD
′
I(ε
+
τI
− C+τI )−
]
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and
εC,τI
.
= ετI − Et
[
1{τI<τC<T}D(τI , τC)LGDC(ε
+
τC
− C+τC )+
]
− Et
[
1{τI<τC<T}D(τI , τC)LGD
′
C(ε
−
τC
− C−τC )+
]
The above treatment of close-out amounts is also known as nested bilateral
CVA due to the nested application of CVA and DVA formulas. A detailed
discussion on the effects of employing such approximation can be found in
Brigo and Morini (2010).
2.6 Special Cases of Bilateral Collateralized CVA
In this section, we specialize the general CVA formula given in Eq. (2). We
start showing the formula in the case when all the exposures are evaluated
at mid-market, i.e. we consider:
εI,t = εC,t = εt
We then obtain that the collateralized bilateral CVA is equal to
BCCVA(t, T ;C) =− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDC(ε
+
τ − C+τ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
C(ε
−
τ − C−τ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDI(ε
−
τ − C−τ )−
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGD
′
I(ε
+
τ − C+τ )−
] (3)
If collateral re-hypothecation is not allowed (LGD′C = LGD
′
I = 0), then the
above formula simplifies to
BCCVA(t, T ;C) =− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDC(ε
+
τ − C+τ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDI(ε
−
τ − C−τ )−
] (4)
On the other hand, if re-hypothecation is allowed and the surviving party
always faces the worst case (LGD′C = LGDC and LGD
′
I = LGDI), then we get
BCCVA(t, T ;C) =− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDC(ετ − Cτ )+
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDI(ετ − Cτ )−
] (5)
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Finally, if we remove collateralization, i.e. Ct = 0, then we recover the
result of Brigo and Capponi (2008) used in Brigo et al. (2009)
BCVA(t, T ) =− Et
[
1{τ=τC<T}D(t, τ)LGDCε
+
τ
]
− Et
[
1{τ=τI<T}D(t, τ)LGDIε
−
τ
] (6)
If we remove collateralization (Ct = 0) and we consider a risk-free investor
(τI → ∞), we recover the result of Brigo and Pallavicini (2007), see also
Canabarro and Duffie (2004).
CVA(t, T ) = −Et
[
1{τC<T}D(t, τC)LGDCε
+
τC
]
(7)
3 Example of Collateralization Schemes
We consider a setting where investor and counterparty exposures equal the
mid-market mark-to-market exposure, where there are no funding costs for
either party, and where re-hypothecation is not allowed. Therefore, the re-
sulting CVA formula is given by Eq. (4). We consider two collateralization
mechanisms.
The first mechanism removes all the exposure risk of the parties and is
therefore called perfect collateralization.
The second mechanism, instead, is the most realistic and follows the
margining practice where during the life of the deal both parties post or
withdraw collateral on a fixed set of dates, according to their current expo-
sure, to or from an account held by the Collateral Taker. In general, the
collateral taker may be a third party or the party of the transaction who
is not posting collateral. We call the second mechanism collateralization
through margining .
3.1 Perfect Collateralization
The perfect collateralization scheme consists in updating the collateral ac-
count continuously, thereby obtaining the following collateralization rule.
Cperfectt := εt
Thus, if we plug it into the collateralized bilateral CVA equation, we get
that all terms drop, as expected, leading to
BCCVA(t, T ;Cperfect) = 0
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and
Et
[
ΠD(t, T ;C)
]
= Et[ Π(t, T ) ] = εt = Cperfectt
Under this collateralization rule, the proper discount curve for pricing
the deal is the collateral accrual curve, see Fujii et al. (2010) and Piterbarg
(2010).
3.2 Collateralization through Margining
We assume that collateral posting only occurs at discrete times on a fixed
grid (t0 = t, . . . , tN = T ), and we allow for the presence of minimum transfer
amounts (M > 0), and thresholds (H), with H ≥ M . Thresholds represent
the amount of permitted unsecured risk, so that they may depend on the
credit quality1 of the counterparties.
A realistic margining practice also includes independent amounts, which
represent a further insurance on the transaction and they are often posted
as an upfront protection, but they may be updated according to exposure
changes. We do not consider independent amounts in the following.
At each collateral posting date ti, the collateral account is updated ac-
cording to changes in exposure. We denote by Ct−i the collateral account
right before the collateral update for time ti takes place, and denote by Ct+i
the collateral account right after the collateral update for time ti takes place.
We first consider how much collateral the investor should post to or withdraw
from the collateral account. This is given by
1{|(εti+HI)−−C−t−
i
|>M}((εti +HI)
− − C−
t−i
) (8)
Then, we consider how much collateral the counterparty should post to or
withdraw from the collateral account. This is given by
1{|(εti−HC)+−C+t−
i
|>M}((εti −HC)+ − C+t−i ) (9)
We have
Ct0 := 0 , Ct+n := 0 , Cu− :=
Cβ(u)+
D(β(u), u)
1Moving thresholds depending on a deterioration of the credit quality of the counter-
parties (downgrade triggers) have been a source of liquidity strain during the market crisis.
See BIS white paper The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality (2010).
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and
Ct+i := Ct
−
i
+ 1{|(εti+HI)−−C−t−
i
|>M}((εti +HI)
− − C−
t−i
)
+ 1{|(εti−HC)+−C+t−
i
|>M}((εti −HC)+ − C+t−i )
(10)
where β(u) is the last update time before u, and t0 < u ≤ tn.
We are also implicitly assuming that, on default occurrence at time ti, all
collateral requests initiated, but not yet completed, are neglected.
In case of no thresholds (HI = HC = 0) and no minimum transfer amount
(M = 0), we obtain a simpler rule
Ct0 = Ct+n = 0 , Ct− =
εβ(u)
D(β(u), u)
, Ct+i = εti
4 Application to Interest-Rate Swaps
In this section we extend the analysis of Brigo et al. (2009) by presenting
some numerics on the collateralized CVA.
First we briefly summarize model assumptions: we consider a model that
is stochastic both in the interest rates (underlying market) and in the default
intensities (investor and counterparty defaults). Joint stochasticity is needed
to introduce correlation between rates and credit. The interest-rate sec-
tor is modeled according to a short-rate Gaussian shifted two-factor process
(hereafter G2++), while each of the two default-intensity sectors is modeled
according to a shifted square-root diffusion process (hereafter SSRD). De-
tails on the G2++ model can be found in Brigo et al. (2009), whereas for the
SSRD model we refer to Brigo and Alfonsi (2005) and Brigo and El-Bachir
(2010). The two models are coupled by correlating their Brownian shocks.
4.1 Interest-Rate Model
For interest rates, we assume that the dynamics of the instantaneous short-
rate process under the risk-neutral measure is given by
r(t) = x(t) + z(t) + ϕ(t;α) , r(0) = r0, (11)
where α is a set of parameters and the processes x and z are Ft adapted and
satisfy
dx(t) = −ax(t) dt+ σ dZ1(t) , x(0) = 0,
dz(t) = −bz(t) dt+ η dZ2(t) , z(0) = 0,
(12)
Brigo, Capponi, Pallavicini, Papatheodorou: Collateral modeling for CVA 23
where (Z1, Z2) is a two-dimensional Brownian motion with instantaneous
correlation ρ12 as from
d〈Z1, Z2〉t = ρ12 dt, , −1 ≤ ρ12 ≤ 1
and r0, a, b, σ, η are positive constants. The model can be extended to
include time-dependend volatilities as shown in Brigo et al. (2009).
We calibrate the interest-rate model parameters to the initial zero coupon
curve observed in the market and to the at-the-money swaption volatilities
quoted by the market on May 26, 2009. Market data and calibrated model
parameters can be found in Brigo et al. (2009), while more details on the
methodology can be found in Brigo and Pallavicini (2007).
4.2 Counterparty and Investor Credit-Spread Models
For the stochastic intensity models we set
λit = y
i
t + ψ
i(t; βi) , i ∈ {I, C} (13)
where whenever we omit the upper index we refer to quantities for both in-
dices. Here the index value“I” denotes the investor and “C” the counterparty.
The function ψ is a deterministic function, depending on the parameter vec-
tor β (which includes y0), that is integrable on closed intervals. The initial
condition y0 is one more parameter at our disposal. We are free to select its
value as long as
ψi(0; β) = λi0 − yi0 , i ∈ {I, C} .
We take y to be a Cox Ingersoll Ross process as given by
dyit = κ
i(µi − yit) dt+ νi
√
yit dZ
i
3(t) , i ∈ {I, C}
where the parameter vector is βi := (κi, µi, νi, yi0) and each parameter is a
positive deterministic constant. As usual, Zi3 is a standard Brownian motion
process under the risk neutral measure. The two processes yI and yC are
assumed to be independent, so that ZI3 is independent of Z
C
3 . Correlation
between defaults of I and C will be introduced as a pure default correla-
tion below. This independence for the spreads is assumed to simplify the
parametrization of the model and focus on default correlation rather than
spread correlation, but the assumption can be removed if one is willing to
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complicate the parametrization of the model. The model can be extended to
incorporate jumps as explained in Brigo and Pallavicini (2007).
We calibrate our model to two different sets of CDS spreads and implied
volatilities, which we name hereafter Mid and High risk settings. The former
set consists of smaller CDS spreads and volatilies than the latter one. More
details on the calibration procedure can be found in Brigo et al. (2009).
4.3 Correlation Parameters
First, we take the short interest-rate factors x and z and the intensity process
y to be correlated, by assuming the driving Brownian motions Z1, Z2 and Z3
to be instantaneously correlated according to
d〈Zj, Zi3〉t = ρj,i dt , j ∈ {1, 2} , i ∈ {I, C}
The instantaneous correlation between the resulting short-rate and the inten-
sity, i.e. the instantaneous interest-rate / credit-spread correlation is constant
and given by
ρ¯i =
σρ1i + ηρ2i√
σ2 + η2 + 2σηρ12
.
Then, concerning default events, we prefer to model default correlation by
introducing a Gaussian copula on default times, rather than by correlating
the default intensities. Thus, we define the cumulative intensities
Λi(0, t) :=
∫ t
0
λi(u) du , i ∈ {I, C}
and we simulate the survival indicator of each name by sampling them as
1{τk<t} = 1{Uk>exp{Λk(0,t)}} , U
k := Φ(zk) , k ∈ {I, C}, (zC , zI) ∼ N2(ρG)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, andN2(ρG)
is the bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation parameter ρG.
Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of free parameters and to
model the correlation structure in a more robust way, in the following we
assume that
ρ1i = ρ2i =: ρ¯i , i ∈ {I, C} .
Hence, we have as free correlation parameters only ρ¯C , ρ¯I and ρG, recov-
ering the other correlations from them.
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4.4 Numerical Examples
We use the collateralization mechanism through margining described in Sec-
tion 3. We assume zero minimum transfer amount and thresholds M =
HI = HC = 0. Under this collateralization mechanism, we consider the be-
havior of the bilateral credit valuation adjustment as a function of δ, where
δ := ti−ti−1 is the time between two consecutive collateral update times. We
consider both the case when received collateral cannot be re-hypothecated
by the collateral taker (BCCVA given by Eq. 4) and and the case when it
can be re-hypothecated and the surviving party always faces the worst case
(BCCVA given by Eq. 5).
Changing the Margining Frequency
First, we consider the margining frequency δ ranging from one week up to
six months. Notice that we are considering interest-rate swaps (IRS) with
one-year payment frequency for the fix leg and six-month frequency for the
floating leg (as usually found in the Euro market ). By keeping the frequency
δ below six month, we avoid jumps in BCCVA occurring at the times when
cash-flows are exchanged.
In figure 1 we show the sensitivity of the BCCVA of an IRS with ten
years maturity to the update frequency of collateral margining, which ranges
from one week to six months. We see that the case of an investor riskier
than the counterparty leads to positive value for BCCVA, while the case of
an investor less risky than the counterparty has the opposite behaviour. In
order to better explain that, we also plot separately the −CCVA and CDVA
terms contributing to the adjustment. It is evident from the figure that, when
the investor is riskier the CDVA part of the correction dominates, while when
the investor is less risky the counterparty has the opposite behaviour. The
effect of re-hypothecation is to enhance the absolute size of the correction,
a reasonable behaviour, since, in such case, each party has a greater risk
because of being unsecured on the collateral amount posted to the other
party in case of default.
Although realistic update frequencies are usually weekly or daily, and
only in exceptional cases reach the order of some months, we also plot all the
cases from 1 to ten years (namely no margining at all) as a tool to discuss
collateral re-hypothecation effects.
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Figure 1: BCCVA for a ten-year IRS under collateralization through margin-
ing as a function of the update frequency δ with ρ¯C = ρ¯I = ρG = 0.
Update frequencies under six months. Continuous lines represent the re-
hypothecation case, while dotted lines represent the opposite case. The red
line represents an investor riskier than the counterparty (mid-risk counter-
party and high-risk investor, or M/H), while the blue line represents an in-
vestor less risky than the counterparty (high-risk counterparty and mid-risk
investor, or H/M). The upper panel plots the BCCVA, while the bottom left
and right panels plot respectively the −CCVA and CDVA components. All
values are in basis points.
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Figure 2: BCCVA for a ten-year IRS under collateralization through margin-
ing as a function of the update frequency δ with ρ¯C = ρ¯I = ρG = 0.
Update frequencies from one to ten years. Continuous lines represent the
re-hypothecation case, while dotted lines represent the opposite case. The
red line represents an investor riskier than the counterparty (mid-risk coun-
terparty and high-risk investor, or M/H), while the blue line represents an
investor less risky than the counterparty (high-risk counterparty and mid-
risk investor, or H/M). The upper panel plots the BCCVA, while the bottom
left and right panels plot respectively the −CCVA and CDVA components.
All values in basis points.
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Figure 3: Left panel: mark-to-market density of a ten-year IRS uncollater-
alized exposure through time. Mid panel: collateral density for six-month
update frequency through time. Right panel: collateral density for one-year
update frequency through time. Continuous lines are distributions’ mean
values, while dotted lines are 95 percentiles.
Inspecting the Exposure Profiles
If we look at figure 2, namely update frequencies greater than one year, we
observe that the case of an investor riskier than the counterparty has a greater
BCCVA without re-hypothecation. The opposite occurs for frequency under
six months. The explanation is due to the fact that the preceding reasoning
holds separately for CCVA and CDVA, and not for their difference. Indeed,
when the update frequency is equal to one year or greater the investor has
a greater probability of posting collateral, as shown in figure 3, leading to
an increase in CCVA when re-hypothecation is allowed, but CDVA is little
affected.
Further insights can be gained by looking at the expected exposure pro-
files which contribute to the BCCVA adjustment. Here, we differentiate
between
• the positive part of the (uncollateralized) exposure ε+u and its negative
part ε−u ;
• the collateralized expected exposure without re-hypothecation contribut-
ing to the CCVA adjustment (ε+u − C+u )+ and the corresponding term
(ε−u − C−u )− contributing to the CDVA adjustment.
• the collateralized expected exposure with re-hypothecation contribut-
ing to the CCVA adjustment (εu − Cu)+ and the corresponding term
(εu − Cu)− contributing to the CDVA adjustment.
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Figure 4: Expected exposure profiles for a ten-year IRS through time. The
borders of the yellow area are the mean values of the positive and negative
parts of the uncollateralized exposures (i.e. E[ ε+ ] and E[ ε− ]), while the blue
lines are collateralized exposures (continuous line is re-hypothecation case,
namely E[ (εu − Cu)+ ] and E[ (εu − Cu)− ]; dotted line the opposite case,
namely E[ (ε+u − C+u )+ ] and E[ (ε−u − C−u )− ]). Left panel: expected exposure
profiles for six months collateral update frequency. Right panel: expected
exposure profiles for one year collateral update frequency. All values are in
basis points.
We can clearly see from the right panel in figure 4 that, when assuming
re-hypothecation, the collateralized expected exposure may exceed the uncol-
lateralized one. This is the case because we may have (εu−Cu)+ > ε+u , which
holds in scenarios where at time t it is more likely that C(t) < 0, i.e. that
collateral is posted by the investor and re-hypothecated by the counterparty.
Therefore, this means that the investor is now exposed to the counterparty
both in terms of the mark-to-market value of the transaction, and also in
terms of the posted collateral, which is an unsecured claim and may not be
returned in full in case of the earlier counterparty default.
Changing the Correlation Parameters
A second example is investigating the effects of correlations (both interest-
rate/credit-spread and default-time correlations) for different frequencies for
collateral update.
First of all, a direct comparison between figures 5 and 6 shows that
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Figure 5: BCCVA with collateral update frequency of one week for a ten-
year IRS (M/H market settings in upper panels, H/M market settings in
lower panels) with different choices of interest-rate/credit-spread correlation
(ρC = ρI parameters, left-side axis) and default-time correlation (ρG Gaus-
sian copula parameter, right-side axis). Left panels show values with re-
hypothecation, while right panels without re-hypothecation. All values in
basis points.
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Figure 6: BCCVA with collateral update frequency of three months for a
ten-year IRS (M/H market settings in upper panels, H/M market settings
in lower panels) with different choices of interest-rate/credit-spread correla-
tion (ρC = ρI parameters, left-side axis) and default-time correlation (ρG
Gaussian copula parameter, right-side axis). Left panels show values with
re-hypothecation, while right panels without re-hypothecation. All values in
basis points.
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increasing the collateral update frequency increases the magnitude of the
BCCVA adjustment (larger update frequency imply larger on-default expo-
sures and thus larger BCCVAs), but it does not substantially change the
dependence pattern of the BCCVA on the correlation parameters. Further,
we notice that we get similar results both by allowing or not allowing re-
hypothecation, or by chaning the market set from M/H to H/M.
We can see that, for a given level of default-time correlation parameter
ρ¯G, a common increase in credit/interest rate correlation parameters ρ¯C and
ρ¯I leads to higher BCCVA adjustments. This is because higher interest rates
will correspond to higher credit spreads, thus putting the receiver swaption
embedded in the CCVA term of the adjustment more out of the money. This
will cause the CCVA term of the adjustment to diminish in absolute value, so
that the final value of the bilateral CVA will be larger for high correlations.
As we are considering a counterparty more risky than the investor, we will
have that the CCVA term will be dominating in the adjustment over the
CDVA term. This is just an example of the complexity of patterns in bilateral
collateralized CVA calculations. Model dependent dynamic parameters such
as volatility and correlations can change the profile of the bilateral CVA
calculation even in presence of collateral
Changing the Credit-Spread Volatility
A third example consists in changing the volatility of the credit spread and
monitor the impact of wrong-way risk for different collateral update frequen-
cies, and for different values of interest-rate/credit-spread correlation.
As in the preceding case we notice in figures 7 and 8 that, for a given level
of the counterparty’s credit-spread volatility paramter νC , the dependency of
BBCVA on the credit/interest rate correlation parameters ρ¯C and ρ¯I leads
to higher adjustments for higher correlations. Regardless of the collateral
update frequency, the credit-spread volatility has only a small impact on the
BCCVA adjustment, which is much more affected by the interest-rate/credit-
spread correlation. However, it is worth noticing that for different choices
of ρ¯C , the dependence pattern of the adjustements on the credit spreads
volatility may be reversed (see for instance the case when ρ¯C = 60% where
the adjustment is decreasing in νC and the case when ρ¯C = −60% where the
adjustment is increasing in νC).
We present a fourth example where we change the volatility of the credit
spread and monitor the impact of wrong-way risk for different collateral up-
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Figure 7: BCCVA with collateral update frequency of one week for a ten-year
IRS (M/H market settings in upper panels, H/M market settings in lower
panels) with different choices of interest-rate/credit-spread correlation (ρC =
ρI parameters, left-side axis) and counterparty’s credit-spread volatility (ν
C
parameter, right-side axis). Left panels show values with re-hypothecation,
while right panels without re-hypothecation. Default-time correlation ρG =
0. All values in basis points.
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Figure 8: BCCVA with collateral update frequency of three months for a ten-
year IRS (M/H market settings in upper panels, H/M market settings in lower
panels) with different choices of interest-rate/credit-spread correlation (ρC =
ρI parameters, left-side axis) and counterparty’s credit-spread volatility (ν
C
parameter, right-side axis). Left panels show values with re-hypothecation,
while right panels without re-hypothecation. Default-time correlation ρG =
0. All values in basis points.
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Figure 9: BCCVA with re-hypothecation for a ten-year IRS with different
choices of counterparty default correlation (ρG parameter, left-side axis) and
counterparty’s credit-spread volatility (νC parameter, right-side axis). We
assume ρC = ρI = 0. The left graph refers to a collateral update frequency
of one week, while the right graph refers to a collateral update frequency of
three months. All values in basis points.
date frequencies, and for different values of counterparty default correla-
tions. We assume flat hazard rate structures, obtained as follows. We take
the maximum CDS spread of the high risk name, let us call it CDSH , and
the maximum CDS spread in the medium risk name, let us call it CDSM .
We use the shift to match a flat hazard rate curve hH = CDS
H/LGD and
hM = CDS
M/LGD. We can see from figure 9 that the adjustments tend
to become higher when the default correlation is positive. This is expected
because when the value of νC is close to zero and the correlation is positive,
the party with higher hazard rate tends to default earlier than the party
with smaller hazard rate in almost all default scenarios. Similarly to figure
8, notice that depending on the default correlation parameter ρG, the depen-
dence pattern of the credit adjustments on the credit spreads volatility may
be reversed (see for instance the case when ρG = 60% where the adjustment
is increasing in νC , and compare it with the case when ρG = −60% where
the adjustment is decreasing in νC).
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5 Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper we described a complete framework for bilateral CVA risk-
neutral pricing inclusive of close-out netting rules and collateral margining,
considering also the case when collateral can be re-hypothecated. We con-
sider interest-rate swap contracts and, show the impact of collateralization
frequency on the bilateral CVA via numerical simulations.
In the future we would like to include even more details of the collateral
margining procedure. In particular we will investigate the impact of time
delay due to dispute resolutions and margin period of risk. Further, we would
like to refine the definition of on-default exposures to match the ongoing work
of ISDA working groups and to incorporate in our framework funding costs
according to realistic liquidity policies.
Possible extesions of our framework should consider default clustering to
address the systemic risk arising from the interconnectedness of banks and
other financial institutions, and study the interplay between liquidity and
(bilateral) counterparty risk in modelling funding curves. We would also like
to address in detail the dynamic hedging of counterparty risk.
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